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Abstract 
Online communication is increasingly associated with growing polarisation in society. In this 
research, we test a dual-pathway model of online polarisation via intergroup and intragroup 
interaction of supporters of opposing ideological camps on YouTube. The interaction occurs 
over a video parody promoting a campaign to change the date of Australia Day celebrations, 
a divisive issue entailing contrasting narratives about Australian identity, meanings of the 
Australia Day, and interpretations of colonial history. To capture ideological polarisation, we 
conducted computerised linguistic analysis of polarised talk in the form of comments and 
replies (N=1,027) from supporters and opponents of the campaign. The indicators used to 
capture polarisation are social identification, position certainty, and psychological distance 
(as reflected by increased anxiety and hostility). Our results show that most polarisation (in 
the form of increased hostility) occurs in conditions of expression of outgroup dissent (the 
intergroup interaction pathway) and the most debated content on the online forum revolves 
around themes relevant to group identity. In addition to contributing to the understanding of 
group process in an online context, another key contribution of this research is providing a 
theory-driven method and blueprint to detect polarisation in social media data.  
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“You wouldn’t celebrate September 11” - testing a dual-pathway model of online 
polarisation on YouTube 
We live in an increasingly polarised world, where contrasting narratives about social 
reality divide societies into opposing (and often mutually exclusive) ideological camps. 
Divides driven by support for different political parties (political polarisation) are becoming 
less relevant, while issue-based polarisation which transcends political affinities seems to be 
a key driver of the current state of fragmentation in Western societies - as for example in 
Britain, it is the people’s positions on Brexit rather than political party identification that 
drives the polarisation in the country (Duffy, Hewlett, McGrae, & Hall, 2019).  This societal 
fragmentation is replicated in the online domain (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) where the 
tendency to cluster according to ideological preferences seems to be even more accentuated 
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015, Barberá, 2015; Gaines, & Mondak, 2009).  
We propose that polarisation between groups from opposing ideological camps, in the 
specific context of online communication, can be understood as driven by both intragroup 
and intergroup mechanisms, whereby ingroup members interact online with other ingroup 
members, and with outgroup members, respectively. In this paper, we test the proposition that 
these different types of online interactions represent two different pathways to polarisation. 
The intragroup pathway is exemplified in recent studies that have focused on the dynamics 
of echo-chambers in the online domain, and which emphasise the impact of ingroup 
interactions between group members (Himelboim, McCreery, & Smith, 2013; Quattrociocchi, 
Scala, & Sunstein, 2016). However, the internet also provides opportunities for people to 
interact with others who are outside their own ideological echo-chambers. This latter type of 
interaction represents the intergroup pathway. In the current research, we use social 
interaction data extracted from YouTube to study the effects of both intragroup and 
intergroup online interactions on polarisation.  
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We refer to polarisation in terms of ideological polarisation, a concept that 
incorporates aspects of political polarisation (defined as an expanding ideological gap 
between groups and increased interpersonal separation between opponents, see Harel, Maoz, 
& Halperin, 2020) and affective polarisation (a construct derived from social identity theory, 
to explain partisan divides as underpinned by an increasing divergence in affect towards the 
ingroup and outgroup, Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Thus, we draw upon on a view of polarisation as rooted in ideological conflict but driven by 
social identity processes. By doing so, we argue that polarising online debates emerge around 
themes that are fundamental to the self-definition of the respective groups in conflict.  
Contrasting Narratives Underpinning Polarisation in Opposing Ideological Camps  
At a basic level, many forms of group behaviour can be understood as attempts by 
group members to change the world according to a particular (collectively shared) narrative 
about social reality. Such narratives can divide societies because they propose conflicting and 
often mutually exclusive versions of social reality, as for example in the contrasting 
narratives driving the climate change divide (Bliuc, McGarty, Thomas, et al., 2015). 
Collective narratives can be understood as coherent stories about social reality that are 
congruent with particular sets of values and systems of beliefs, reflecting alternative world 
views about how the world should be and effectively dividing the society into opposing 
ideological camps (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & 
Bongiorno, 2009). Such narratives can help us understand consensus within a group, that is, 
the “truth” upon which group members agree (Bessi, Coletto, Scala, Caldarelli, 
Quattrociocchi, 2015). They can inform our understanding of the core beliefs and values of a 
particular group or, put differently, they can shape the content of a particular social identity 
with its associated values, beliefs, and behaviour-prescribing norms (Livingstone & Haslam, 
2008).  
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While contrasting narratives can form the bases of societal fragmentation within 
opposing ideological camps (at the intergroup level), they can also provide the bases of 
consensus and unification within a group (at the intragroup level). Here, in seeking to 
understand how polarisation occurs in the context of intergroup conflict between people from 
opposing ideological camps, we focused on the contested understanding and the associated 
narratives about the Australian national identity. A key issue that Australians from opposing 
ideological camps debate about online is the celebration of Australia Day on January 26. The 
January 26 commemoration marks the landing of the first British fleet to Australian shores in 
1788. There is one narrative that identifies the arrival of the fleet led by Arthur Phillip as an 
invasion legitimatised by the British imperialist rule, representing the beginning of the 
dispossession and genocide of the Indigenous people in Australia (Maddison, 2012). 
Supporters of this narrative advocate for changing the date of the national day via a campaign 
known as “Change the date”.  
An alternative narrative (endorsed by the current Australian government) construes 
this particular date as the day when modern Australia was founded (through colonization 
nevertheless) and advocates for maintaining the date as it is. These two narratives are also 
aligned to contrasting understandings and definitions of the Australian national identity 
(Bliuc, McGarty, Hartley, & Muntele, 2012). In particular, people who identify as Australian 
may support different versions of this social category - on one hand, a nationalistic version 
with its core values linked to race, ethnicity, and religion (i.e., British, white, Christian) 
aligned to support for maintaining the current date to celebrate Australia’s day, and choosing 
to overlook the significance of the date for Indigenous Australians. On the other hand, 
Australians may identify with a more inclusive version of the national identity (Reicher, 
Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006), supporting cultural diversity and more sensitive 
towards issues pertinent to Indigenous Australians. This version of national identity is aligned 
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to support for a change of date (Maddison, 2012; Moran, 2011; Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). 
Thus, support or opposition to the “Change the date” campaign cannot be solely explained by 
reference to social categories based on political orientation or cultural belonging. Instead, in 
this context, we can conceptualise the intergroup conflict driving the debate as conflict 
between two opposite ideological camps based on shared views about what being a “true” 
Australian means (Bliuc et al., 2012; Reicher et al., 2006).  
Online Ideological Polarisation on YouTube   
Rapid advances in information and communication technologies have enabled us to 
live highly connected lives in which finding like-minded people – those who share our views 
about the world – is only a few clicks away. As a result, people can choose to primarily 
interact online with others who share their views, or when engaging with social and political 
issues, with those who belong to the same ideological camp as them (social interactions at an 
intragroup level). Where people are only exposed to information from the ingroup, echo-
chambers can form (Bakshy et al., 2015). Platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where 
exposure to similar ideas is embedded in their core functionality, provide ideal conditions for 
the formation of echo-chambers (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & Bonneau, 2015; 
Himelboim et al.,  2013) and further polarisation (Barberá et al., 2015; Bessi et al., 2015; 
Conover et al., 2011).  
According to classic research in social psychology, polarisation can occur via 
increased intragroup interaction where group discussion on contentious issues results in 
division within the group and a shift to the extreme group positions (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 
1969). In other words, group polarisation occurs when members of a deliberating group move 
towards a more extreme point in direction of the initial position of the group, so that, for 
example, members of anti-abortion group discussing the issue of abortion, will become more 
extreme in their views after the discussion (Sunstein, 1999; see also Myers & Bishop, 1970). 
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The same polarising effect can be observed in online interactions occurring in echo-
chambers. In echo-chambers, beyond the shift in the initial position, polarisation seems to 
lead to a decreased likelihood to interact with outgroup members (Quattrociocchi, Scala, & 
Sunstein, 2016) and the formation of “identity bubbles” (Kaakinen, Sirola, Savolainen, & 
Oksanen, A., 2020; Oksanen, Oksa, Savela, Kaakinen, & Ellonen, 2020). The polarisation of 
attitudes in echo-chambers is well-illustrated by research on the far-right in which online 
participation in radical echo-chambers (such as neo-Nazi and white supremacist forums) lead 
to changes in group norms and increased unification at intragroup level (Bliuc, Betts, 
Vergani, et al., 2019; 2010; Bliuc, Betts, Faulkner, et al., 2020; Wojcieszak, 2010; for a 
review see Bliuc, Faulkner, Jakubowicz, & McGarty, 2018).  
While user-driven spaces with restricted/members-only forums such as Facebook and 
discussion groups are best suited to encourage echo-chambers and therefore intragroup 
interaction, content-driven sites such as online open discussion sites are ideal platforms for 
intergroup communication. In particular, there are many (content-driven) online spaces that 
encourage interaction between people from opposing ideological camps. Such online spaces 
post contentious content which is debated by online users who identify with a particular 
ideological camp (or opinion) in relation to the issue. For example, an online news article on 
the pro-life movement would likely draw users who identify either as pro-life or pro-choice, 
so that its comments section would represent a platform for both intragroup and intergroup 
interaction (i.e., interactions between both users who agree and between users who disagree 
on the issue of abortion).  
In echo-chambers, polarisation occurs because of both intragroup influence and 
restricted access to diverse views (political homophily, Vaccari, Valeriani, Barberá, et al., 
2016). However, exposure to diverse views does not necessary represent an antidote to 
polarisation. On the contrary, exposure to diverse and in particular opposing views of an 
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ideological outgroup can be seen as another pathway to polarisation – that is, polarisation via 
intergroup interaction (Bail, Argyle, Brown, et al., 2018; Pauwels & Schils, 2016). When 
interacting with people with opposing views, polarisation occurs through a process of 
“disconfirmation bias” (see Karlsen et al., 2017; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009) when 
people become stronger in their beliefs after being presented with counterarguments from an 
outgroup.  
Indicators of ideological polarisation  
Our understanding of polarisation is drawn from definitions of political and affective 
polarisation and can be operationalised as both ideological and psychological distancing 
between people from opposing ideological groups (see also similar conceptualisations of 
opinion polarisation from physical statistics, Castellano, Fortunato, & Loreto, 2009). Social 
interaction in conditions of ideological intergroup conflict can result in polarised social 
identities (including in online contexts, see Pauwels & Schils, 2016) because the groups are 
each fighting for their own cause – emphasising and exacerbating intergroup differences 
(Bliuc et al., 2012; 2015). This is because, according to the social identity approach (SIA, 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987), in contexts of intergroup conflict group identities 
become more salient, a process which in turn leads to group members’ adoption of 
stereotypical group behaviour and expression of social identification (Turner et al., 1987). 
This ideological distancing will therefore manifest as increased identification with the 
respective group (Bliuc et al., 2015) and increased certainty and confidence about the group 
position (Bliuc et al., 2007). In ideological camps defined by a particular position which is in 
opposition to the outgroup, disagreement with the outgroup is expected, so intergroup 
interaction should further increase group identification via increased position certainty  
(Feixas, & Winter, 2019; Holtz & Miller, 2001; Holtz & Nihiser, 2008; Turner & Tajfel, 
1986). Psychological distancing, on the other hand, as increasing opposition between ingroup 
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and outgroup, can be captured by collective emotions such as hostility and intergroup 
anxiety, which can arise as a result of perceived threat (in this case, symbolic) from 
interaction with outgroup members (Stephan & Stephan, 1985, Stephan & Renfro, 2002; 
Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2017). In this context, the construct of psychological distance 
applies to intergroup processes, therefore differing from alternative conceptualisations where 
psychological distance refers to an individual process of affective detachment where people 
tend to ‘psychologically remove themselves from emotionally painful events’ (Cohn, Mehl, 
& Pennebaker, 2001; Pennebaker & King, 1999).  
 
Present Research  
In the current research, we aim to address the question of what happens in online 
spaces when people interact outside their echo-chambers, that is, in virtual spaces where they 
can interact with both people who share their views and people who have opposing views to 
their own. We seek to test the effects of both intragroup and intergroup interaction on 
polarisation, therefore, we used YouTube to examine social interactions occurring at both 
levels. YouTube is particularly well suited for this type of inquiry as it is a platform that by 
design can engage users from opposite ideological camps through the distribution of 
controversial socio-political video content. Unlike social networking sites such as Facebook 
and Twitter where the focus is on the relationships between users, YouTube is focused on 
content viewing (de Bérail, Guillon, & Bungener, 2019; Khan, 2017), with the option to react 
to the content and also interact with other users by commenting and replying to comments of 
the other users.  
The main objective of our study is to test a dual-pathway model to ideological 
polarisation in an online context; a first pathway to polarisation being via intragroup 
interactions with ingroup members (i.e., similarly to processes occurring within echo-
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chambers), while a second pathway being via intergroup interactions with outgroup members. 
We investigate these pathways in an online context where online users from opposing 
ideological camps are exposed to both ingroup consensus and outgroup dissent (Grauwin & 
Jensen, 2012; Liu & Srivastava, 2015; Burke & Goodman, 2012; Guo & Harlow, 2014; 
Harlow, 2015). In our study, we captured polarisation by focusing on three key dimensions of 
polarised talk: a) social identification with one ideological camp; b) certainty (of the 
ideological position of the respective camp); and c) psychological distance from the opposed 
ideological camp (increased anxiety, hostility). More specifically, we sought to test the 
general prediction that those dimensions of polarisation are increased by both online social 
interactions between people from opposing camps (i.e., interaction in the context of 
intergroup dissent) and online interaction with people from the same camp (i.e., interaction in 
the context of intragroup consensus). Furthermore, intergroup conflict between groups drawn 
from opposing ideological camps is likely to be an identity-driven process where issues with 
direct relevance to the group’s self-definition are the most debated. From this, it follows that 
the most polarising topics that the opposing sides of a conflict engage with would likely be 
most directly pertinent to group’s identity.  
However, different indicators of group polarisation would be differently affected by 
intragroup versus intergroup interactions. In particular, it was expected that intragroup 
interaction (interaction in the form of intragroup position validation and endorsement) would 
primarily lead to increases in position certainty or self-defining belief validation (H1), while 
intergroup interactions (interaction in the form of expressing and endorsing intergroup 
dissent) would most likely lead to increases in social identification (as captured by the use of 
pronouns) and psychological distance as captured by anxiety, hostility and use of swear 
words (H2). In addition, it is expected that the most debated themes on the online forum will 
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be pertinent to group identity, that is, polarisation will mostly occur in clusters debating these 
themes (H3).  
By focusing on online contexts of interaction, we can test this dual-pathway model of 
polarisation where polarisation occurs in the conditions of intergroup conflict via online 
social interaction within and between opposite ideological camps. In other words, we 
examine interaction at intragroup level (in the context of consensus within the ingroup) and 
intergroup level (in the context of dissent with the outgroup) by focusing on social 
interactions between two groups drawn from opposing ideological camps on YouTube. The 
specific issue that is debated here is about changing the date for the Australia Day (i.e., 
supporting versus being opposed to the “Change the date” campaign). However, the real  
basis of division that drives the polarisation in this case is conflict about competing narratives 
about Australian national identity. This conflict divides the Australian society into opposing 
ideological camps which are distinct psychological groups that endorse alternative narratives 
about the meaning of the Australian national identity with corresponding contrasting 
interpretations of historical events.  
Method  
Data collection  
We extracted anonymous comments and replies to comments that were posted in 
response to an Australia Day parody video “Change the date of Australia Day” 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UytdM-x3cv4) on YouTube. The video was produced by 
The Juice Media (http://www.thejuicemedia.com.au), an independent online media website 
and posted on YouTube on 24/01/2017. The video is a parody of anti-piracy video popular in 
Australia in the 2000s (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmZm8), and makes parallels 
between Australia day commemorations and celebrating historical disasters and atrocities 
such as September ’11, Hiroshima and the Holocaust (i.e., historical dates of human atrocity).  
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(The Juice Media, 2017) 
 
As of March 2020, the video had a total of 155,374 views and generated 4.3K likes 
and 4.1K dislikes, 1 million views and 9K shares on Facebook. Data was collected and 
analysed at the level of contribution, not the contributor. From the total of 1,415 contributions 
(comments and replies) from 646 users, only the comments and replies that could be 
categorised as either in favour or against the campaign were retained for the analysis (a total 
of 1,027; N comments = 434 and N replies = 593). Seventy-six comments were categorised as 
being in favour of the “Change the date campaign” (contributed by the supporters of the 
campaign) and 358 as being against the campaign (contributed the opponents of the 
campaign), while 265 replies were in favour of the campaign and 328 against.  
Coding process. Two of the researchers conducted the coding of the comments and 
posts as either being in favour or against the ‘Change the date’ campaign, an approach drawn 
from previous research on racism that used similar categorisations of online posts (Bliuc et 
al., 2012; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2016). First, the criteria of categorisation were discussed to 
ensure that both coders had the same understanding of the categorisation criteria. That is, the 
posts (comments and replies) were assessed as to whether they contained either 
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agreement/expressions of positive attitude or disagreement/expressions of negative attitude 
towards: 
a) the campaign (e.g., pro-campaign content: “totally agree with this. This is why i 
don't celebrate Australia day (…)” versus anti-campaign content: “Absolute crap. Throw 
some lamb on the barbie and shut the f** up.”; “Preachy and ineffectual. Just like the original 
ad”);  
b) the particular historical narrative endorsed by each of the two camps (e.g., pro-
campaign content: “What you're celebrating is mass murder of traditional owners of this land. 
You owe it to yourselves to better educate yourself of Australia's past (…)” versus anti-
campaign content: ““f** you this was the day cap cook landed not the day we colonised”);  
c) the members of the outgroup (e.g., pro-campaign content: “You have angered the 
mindless nationalists. Keep up the good work. They only respond like this to that which they 
fear - namely the education of their peers.” versus anti-campaign content: “You hate 
Australia Day so much? That terrible day when those nasty Brits arrived? Fine, get rid of 
those clothes and put a loincloth back on. Centrelink payments? Stop taking those too. Get rid 
of your cars, stop using all that lovely medicine, abandon your houses and go back deep into 
the bush where you can live as your uncivilised people once did, you wouldn't last two 
minutes.”)  
Initially, about 10% of all posts were coded in a joint session that allowed the coders 
to discuss posts they were uncertain about and agree on the categorisation. This session was 
followed by independent coding by each of the coders of the remaining posts. The process 
concluded with a final session where the codes were reviewed and any discrepancy in coding 
resolved. At the end of this process, some of the posts were excluded from the analysis, that 
is, posts including either content about the artistic quality of the video (or the lack of it) or 
ambiguous content unrelated to the campaign. 
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Study design  
The naturalistic context of the online interaction in the form of comments and replies to 
the YouTube video advocating for the ‘Change the date’ campaign provided ideal conditions 
(harder to achieve in a traditional lab environment) to test how indicators of polarisation are 
affected by both intragroup and intergroup interaction. In particular, comments made in 
response to the video could be classified as either in favour of the campaign (i.e., context of 
intragroup validation/expressing consensus) or against the campaign (i.e., context of 
intergroup contestation/expressing dissent). Replies made in response to comments could be 
also classified as either in favour or against the campaign, but the possibility to express 
agreement to comments against the campaign provided an additional level of interaction – 
going beyond expressing consensus or dissent towards the campaign, there is the possibility 
of both endorsing dissent (replies opposing the campaign) and endorsing consensus (replies 
in favour of the campaign). Therefore, the structure of the online interactions provided 
conditions for four types of interactions on the YouTube video:  
1. Expressing consensus (direct intragroup validation: comments in favour of the 
campaign) 
2. Expressing dissent (direct intergroup contestation: comments against the campaign) 
3. Endorsing consensus (indirect intragroup validation: replies in favour of the 
campaign) 
4. Endorsing dissent (indirect intergroup contestation: replies against the campaign) 
This created four types of interactions, and two independent variables for our analyses: group 
categorisation (by position towards the campaign: pro-campaign/position validation versus 
anti-campaign/position contestation) and type of contribution (comment versus reply). 
The dependent variables were the indicators of polarisation in the form of 
identification, position certainty, and psychological distance (captured by anxiety, hostility 
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and use of swear words). To identify the most polarising themes in the online forum, we 
identified the most debated comments (those comments that generated the most replies).  
Measures  
We used LIWC software (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015) to process the 
textual data in the posts and create quantitative variables to capture polarisation. The software 
automatically scans the chosen text (i.e., the comment or reply) for words and phrases that 
are present in the LIWC 2015 dictionary (lexicon) and provides a score to indicate the 
percentage of words in that text that are in specific dictionary word categories. The word 
categories include both linguistic categories (e.g., pronouns) and psychological dimensions 
(e.g., affect, cognition, drives, etc.). LIWC has been used in numerous studies to measure 
various variables, with different samples and has shown that the psychometrics of word 
categories are valid (for a review see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  
Social identification. To capture social identification, we used the LIWC 
subcategories of first-person plural pronouns (e.g., we, our, us), and third person plural words 
(e.g., they, their, they’d) to capture social identification with the respective camps. The use of 
words that capture intergroup (“us versus them”) language as indicating social identification 
is consistent with previous research (Smith, Gavin, & Sharp, 2015; e.g., Bliuc et al., 2017; 
2018; 2019; Faulkner & Bliuc, 2018).  
Position certainty. The LIWC categories of certainty as a positive indicator (e.g., 
always, never) and tentativeness as a negative indicator (e.g., maybe, perhaps) were used to 
capture certainty.  
Psychological distance. Three indicators of psychological distance were used: 
anxiety, anger, and use of swear words (the latter two to capture hostility). We used the 
LIWC category anxiety (e.g., worried, fearful). For hostility, we used the LIWC categories 
anger (e.g., hate, kill, annoyed), and swear words (e.g., f***, damn, sh**). 
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Data analysis  
The structure of online interactions between users on YouTube creates conditions for  
four types of interactions, and two independent variables for our analyses: group 
categorisation (by position on the campaign: pro-campaign/position validation versus anti-
campaign/position contestation) and type of contribution (comment versus reply). Means, 
standard deviations (SD), and correlations were calculated for all variables. Mean differences 
in the indicators of polarisation across the four types of interactions were compared using the 
open-source statistical software JASP (JASP Team, 2020).  
In addition to the quantitative analysis, to determine whether the most debated themes 
on the online forum are pertinent to group identity (H3), the text of comments that generated 
the most replies were collated and analysed using an approach derived from thematic analysis 
(based on the steps outlined by Braun & Clarke, 2006). In particular, the analysis of the 
qualitative data was structured into several steps as illustrated in Table 1:  
Insert Table 1 about here  
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
Across both comments and replies, the mean number of words for contributions made 
by supporters and opponents of the campaign were similar (N supporters = 341 , M = 54.196, 
SD = 82.478, range from 1 to 806; and N opponents = 686, M = 50.063, SD = 69.135, range 
from 1 to 782 for opponents). The descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and 
Pearson’s correlations) for all the dependent variables (i.e., we, they, certainty, tentativeness, 
anxiety, anger and swear words) are shown in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here  
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Main analyses  
The effects of type of social interaction on polarisation. We conducted MANOVA 
to test whether intragroup and intergroup interactions resulted in relative differences in 
polarised talk, indexed by expressions of ingroup identification (as captured by the use of 
‘we’ and ‘they’ pronouns), certainty (as captured by the use of certainty and tentativeness 
linguistic categories), and psychological distance (as captured by the use of anxiety, anger, 
and swear words categories).  
In the MANOVA, we entered group categorisation (by position on the campaign: pro-
campaign/position validation versus anti-campaign/position contestation) and type of 
contribution (comment versus reply) as independent variables. The assumption of 
homogeneity of covariance was violated (Box’s χ² = 1549.700, p <.001), so we report Pillai’s 
trace values in addition to Wilks . The analysis shows a significant multivariate effect for 
the interaction between group categorisation and type of contribution (Wilks  = .969, p 
<.001; TracePillai = .031, p <.001). Both group categorisation and the type of contribution had 
significant separated effects on the dependent variables (Wilks  = 0.977, p =.001, TracePillai 
= .023, p <.001 and Wilks  = 0.943, p <.001, TracePillai = .57, p <.001, respectively). As a 
follow-up to MANOVA, a series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted on each of the 
dependent variables. Means and standard deviations both across comments and replies and 
across pro-campaign and anti-campaign contributions are reported in Table 3. F-values with 
corresponding effect sizes for all the indicators are reported in Table 4.  
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here  
 
Post-hoc analyses were conducted to examine individual mean difference 
comparisons across the groups and different types of contributions. The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated for most of the variables, so unless specified 
otherwise, Games-Howell post-hoc comparisons are used. We found a mixed pattern of 
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differences in levels of all the indicators of polarisation across groups and different types of 
contributions with the exception of anxiety (which did not significantly vary across groups 
and types of contributions).  
Identification. No significant differences were found between levels of use of first 
person plural pronouns (e.g., “we”) across contributions from the pro-campaign versus anti-
campaign groups. However, the use of these pronouns was significantly higher in comments 
than in replies (Mdiff = 0.427; t = 2.227, ptukey=0.026, Cohen’s d = 0.142), suggesting that 
online contributors tended to focus on the ingroup (rather than the outgroup) when expressing 
their ingroup opinion. Significant differences were found in the use of third person plural 
pronouns (e.g., “they”), which was significantly higher in replies compared to comments 
(Mdiff = -0.477; t = -2.742, ptukey=0.006,  Cohen’s d = 0.176), suggesting that references to 
outgroup (as “they”) were higher when the ingroup position was endorsed (in replies), rather 
than when group position was expressed (in comments). However, there was no significant 
simple interaction effect found for both the use of “we” and “they” pronouns.  
Position certainty. Certainty tended to be higher in posts from the pro-campaign 
group compared to the anti-campaign group, but the difference did not reach significance 
(Mdiff = 0.428; t = 1.856, ptukey<0.064, Cohen’s d = 0.128).  There was no significant 
difference between levels of certainty in comments versus replies. In the case of tentativeness 
(as a negative indicator of position certainty) the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
met, so we report results of standard post-hoc comparisons. Tentativeness was higher in 
replies compared to the comments (Mdiff = -0.678; t = -2.451, ptukey=0.014, Cohen’s d = 
0.097), but they were no significant differences between levels of tentativeness across groups 
(Mdiff = -0.530; t = -1.917, ptukey=0.056, Cohen’s d = 0.046). One simple interaction effect 
was significant, showing that tentativeness in the pro-campaign comments was significantly 
lower than in anti-campaign replies (Mdiff = -1.208; t = -2.589, ptukey=0.048, Cohen’s d = 
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0.346). These findings suggests that in direct expressions of group position (in comments), 
there are lower levels of tentativeness that in replies, when the group position is endorsed, 
and this effect is maintained in expressions of group position in the pro-campaign camp (in 
comparison to when anti-campaign group position is endorsed in replies).  
Anxiety. For anxiety, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, so we 
report results of standard post-hoc comparisons that show that anxiety did not significantly 
differ between comments and replies (Mdiff = 0.079; t = 0.874, ptukey= 0.382, Cohen’s d = 
0.034), and between pro-campaign and anti-campaign contributions (Mdiff = 0.022; t = 0.239, 
ptukey= 0.811, Cohen’s d = 0.021). No interaction effects were significant.  
Hostility. Anger was higher in contributions from the anti-campaign group (Mdiff = -
1.716; t = -4.222, ptukey<0.00, Cohen’s d = 0.254) and higher in comments than in replies 
(Mdiff = 3.002; t = 5.976, ptukey<.001, Cohen’s d = 0.395). Three simple interactions were also 
significant. That is, anger was significantly higher in anti-campaign comments compared to 
pro-campaign comments (Mdiff = -.2.861; t = -3.146, ptukey = 0.009, Cohen’s d = 0.349), in 
anti-campaign comments compared to pro-campaign replies (Mdiff = 3.530; t = 6.050, 
ptukey<.001, Cohen’s d = 0.499), and in anti-campaign comments compared to anti-campaign 
replies (Mdiff = 3.481; t = 6.326, ptukey<.001, Cohen’s d = 0.441). The use of swear words was 
higher in comments than in replies (Mdiff = 3.354; t = 5.986, ptukey<.001, Cohen’s d = 0.399), 
and in contributions from the anti-campaign group compared to those from the pro-campaign 
group (Mdiff = -1.838; t = -4.300, ptukey<.001, Cohen’s d = 0.253). Again, three simple 
interactions were significant, the use of swear words being significantly higher in anti-
campaign comments compared to pro-campaign comments (Mdiff = -32.565; t = -2.676, ptukey 
= 0.038, Cohen’s d = 0.418), to pro-campaign replies (Mdiff = 3.908; t = 6.139, ptukey<.001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.282 ), and anti-campaign replies (Mdiff = 3.746; t = 6.239, ptukey<.001, Cohen’s 
d = 0.442 ). These findings show that intergroup interaction (and in particular in the conflict 
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conditions present when anti-campaign expressions of group position were made) resulted in 
increased psychological distance as captured by increased hostility in polarised talk.  
Thematic analysis of the most debated comments  
To examine H3, we analysed the content of comments that received 5 or more replies, 
that is, from a total of 434 comments only 20 received 5 or more replies. The number of 
replies for these comments ranged from 5 to 123 (M = 27.65, SD = 32.43). From these 
comments, 3 comments were in favour of the campaign and 27 against. The description of the 
final themes that emerged from the analysis of the most contentious comments is presented 
below. Two inter-related key themes were identified: one about the interpretation of the 
historical narrative regarding the arrival of the first fleet to Australia, and the second about 
the contested meanings of the Australia day. In line with our predictions, both these themes 
were debated by using identity-related arguments that were promoting contrastive versions of 
the Australian identity in a similar way found in previous research on the differing meaning 
of social identity content (Bliuc et al., 2012; Reicher et al., 2006). Table 5 summarises the 
key themes emerging from the analysis of the most debated comments together with the 
specific arguments used for each and corresponding illustrative quotes.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Most narratives about the historic truth were based on the argument that no harm was 
done to the Indigenous population on that specific day, but this version is contested in 
contributions that suggest that it does not really matter what happened on that day – the 
reality is that it marked the beginning of a period of injustice and violence against the 
Indigenous population. More extreme versions of this narrative see Australia as a country that 
was conquered through a war which was lost by the original inhabitants (see Extract 2 in 
Table 5).  
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The meaning of Australia day on that particular date was construed in contrasting 
narratives as either marking the start of a period of grave injustice and violence against 
Indigenous Australians or marking the start of modern Australia, a wealthy and successful 
nations (thus being deserving of celebration). This narrative in particular seemed to be linked 
to the most blatant racist content against Indigenous Australians (in arguments that suggested 
that as recipients of welfare, Indigenous Australians have the most to gain from the modern 
state). A less blatantly racist version of this narrative was around calls for unity in celebrating 
Australia, so that the meaning of Australia Day seen as being about celebrating modern 
Australia not the past (see Extract 4 in Table 5).  
Importantly in the context of our predictions (and in particular H3), both of these 
themes are directly relevant to definitions of the Australian identity and entail distinct values, 
norms, and emotions. That is, one of the narratives about the historical events around January 
26 promotes a version of history about the roots of Australian identity where colonisers had 
nothing to be feel guilty about (either no violence was committed or the violence was 
justified). At the same time, the opposing narrative assigns blames to the colonisers, but at 
the same time extends the definition of what it means to be Australian by including the 
Indigenous population. A similar process could be seen in the case of the contrasting 
narratives about the meaning of the celebration. Again, one narrative promoted an exclusive 
focus on the present and future of the country, so Australia day was construed as a 
celebration of the benefits of modern Australia, while ignoring the past (a positive image of 
Australian identity is endorsed). The opposing narrative was more focused on the past and 
promoting reparation for the injustice and harm done to Indigenous Australians by the British 
colonisers (this narrative recognised the past wrongdoings and proposes a version of national 
identity that acknowledges guilt and apology).   
Discussion 
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The key aim of this study was to test a dual-pathway model of polarisation that would 
capture how ideological polarisation can occur both via intragroup interaction (position 
validation by ingroup) and intergroup interaction (position contestation by outgroup). 
Specifically, we expected that intragroup interactions would mostly increase confidence in 
the group position (position certainty, H1), while intergroup interactions would mostly 
increase ingroup identification (via increased social identity salience due to the intergroup 
context and increased group-defining position certainty) and group differences resulting in 
increased psychological distance (as captured by anxiety, hostility, and use of swear words, 
H2). Interaction was conceptualised as online communication between contributors from 
opposing ideological camps, so it was also expected that, in terms of the content of 
communication, the most debated themes would be relevant to the group’s identity (H3). 
Thus, by analysing the most debated content in the online forum, we expected to be able to 
detect specific identity-relevant markers of polarised talk in this specific context.  
These propositions were tested in opposing ideological camps formed around 
contrasting narratives about national identity in Australia. That is, we examined differences 
in polarised talk (captured by linguistic indicators of identification, certainty, tentativeness, 
anxiety, and hostility - anger and swearing) across different types of social interactions about 
the ‘Change the Date’ campaign in Australia. Our argument was that public division driven 
by this campaign represents more than a conflict of opinions about when to celebrate the 
Australia day; rather, in line with previous work, it encapsulates conflict between 
psychologically meaningful social identities that are aligned to particular social categories, 
but are not reducible to these (Bliuc et al., 2015; 2019).  
The online context of social interactions in response to a YouTube video supporting 
the Change the date campaign in Australia provided ideal conditions to test our theoretical 
assumptions as captured by the effects of naturalistic interactions between supporters and 
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opponents of the campaign on the indicators of ideological polarisation. That is, comments 
from supporters of the campaign made directly in response to the video represented 
intragroup validation (expressing group position as intragroup consensus) while comments 
from opponents of the campaign represented intergroup invalidation (expressing group 
position as intergroup dissent). The way in which YouTube is designed to provide 
opportunities to users to engage with comments, created an opportunity for us to examine the 
effects of conditions in which there is an indirect expression of intragroup validation and 
intergroup invalidation. In particular, replies in favour of the campaign were used to endorse 
consensus (indirect intragroup validation), while replies against the campaign to endorse 
dissent (indirect intergroup invalidation). Thus, the nature of the structure of this online social 
interaction data enabled us to compare different pathways to polarisation and their 
differential effects on polarised talk in real supporters and opponents of a campaign 
addressing core defining issues about what a modern Australian national identity may entail. 
Our study proves that online platforms can play an important role in theory testing that goes 
beyond the lab and applies to issues that really matters to people and society at large.  
Our hypotheses, however, were not entirely supported by our data. That is, we found 
a main effect of the interaction between group and type of contributions on polarisation 
indicators, suggesting that polarisation is indeed affected by the type of the interactions 
between members of opposing ideological camps. However, the simple effects of these 
interactions on various indicators were mixed. In particular, we found that the indicators of 
hostility (anger and use of swear words) were highest in conditions of direct expression of 
intergroup dissent. That is, when people interacted with content that contradicted their 
ingroup ideology, expressions of hostility were at their highest (not surprisingly, higher than 
in comments and replies from the pro-campaign group, but also higher than anti-campaign 
replies/expression of endorsement of dissent). In line with our predictions, ingroup position 
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validation (in the form of decreased tentativeness only) was increased in conditions of 
intragroup validation (when expressing consensus with the ingroup in the form of comments 
in favour of the campaign). However, contrary to our prediction, group identification as 
captured by the use of first person and third person plural pronouns did not vary across the 
contributions from different groups (between supporters and opponents of the campaign) in 
both comments and replies, but rather a focus on ‘us’ as a collective entity (as reflected in the 
use of first-person plural pronouns) seemed apparent in conditions of expressing the group’s 
ideology (versus endorsing it). Also, anxiety as capturing one aspect of psychological 
distancing, did not significantly change across conditions. Overall, we found that it is mostly 
intergroup interaction, when direct dissent is expressed, that drove polarisation, in particular 
in the form of increased hostility. Whilst this study used a relatively small sample and 
focused on a specific context, these findings are consistent with research from 
communication science on online political newsgroups reporting showing that discussion 
tends to happen between clusters of like-minded groups (via intergroup processes) rather 
within these clusters (via intragroup processes see Kelly, et al., 2005). This preference for 
such discussion may be driven by a motivation to deliberate, debate, and argue rather than 
agree with others, which is particularly salient in the case of emotionally charged and 
controversial socio-political issues (Yardi, & Boyd, 2010). 
Our analysis of qualitative data is consistent with previous research on social identity 
content, showing that a single social category (e.g., Australian national identity) can 
incorporate different sets of beliefs, values and associated norms, and therefore division and 
conflict can occur as a result of contestation of the very bases of the social category (Bliuc et 
al., 2012; Reicher et al., 2006). Put simply, division and intergroup conflict can occur 
because of dissent around the meaning of a social category. Furthermore, our findings 
suggest that these debates around the meaning of Australian national identity in this case, 
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were likely conducive of further polarisation between competing groups. Ideally, this 
theoretical point would be further tested in studies using experimental designs (so causality 
can be clearly established by investigating whether debates on identity-relevant issues lead to 
further polarisation between members of opposing groups).  
Despite the affordances provided by the online context of our study, there are several 
limitations imposed by this same context. For instance, our findings are based on the study of 
polarisation processes in the specific context of online debates about a particular political 
issue in a particular cultural context, that is, the legitimacy of celebrating Australia’s national 
day on January 26. We believe, however that given that the indicators of polarised talk that 
we used in this study, and the theoretical basis for our hypotheses, are independent of the 
socio-political context under investigation, it is possible that the same processes and patterns 
of results can be observed in other contexts. Indeed, we argue that it is likely these findings 
would apply to other debates about divisive issues in society (including debates about the 
meaning of national identity but extending beyond these), but future studies should firmly 
establish if this is the case. Furthermore, in the current research, these debates are generated 
by exposure to one video that promotes the ‘Change the date’ campaign. If this research is 
seen as analogous with studies conducted in the laboratory, this would be the equivalent of 
drawing conclusions based on a single study. Therefore, we recommend that our propositions 
should be further tested in the future by a) using larger samples of online textual data, b) 
conducting further studies using similar designs, and c) using additional indicators of 
polarization. These recommendations would also help address the issue of relatively small 
magnitude of the effects that we found.   
 
Conclusion 
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In sum, we found that in an online context of debates around national identity, 
intergroup interactions increase hostility, while intragroup interactions decrease tentativeness 
in expressions of group position (in comments). Our qualitative analysis of the most debated 
contributions suggests that identity debates are at the core of polarised talk in the context of 
our study. The key implication here is that there appears to be a dual pathway to polarisation 
but that intergroup and intragroup interactions have varied effects on different indicators of 
polarisation. Overall, the present study demonstrates that supporters and opponents are not 
just individuals who hold competing views about what it means to be Australian; rather they 
are individuals who belong to distinct and opposing psychological groups that endorse 
contrasting narratives about Australian identity. Thus, when they interact online they 
reproduce patterns that may occur within and between other groups in conflict (such as racist 
and activist groups, see Faulkner & Bliuc, 2018; Bliuc et al., 2018; 2019; Smith, Wakeford, 
Cribbin, Barnett, & Hou, 2020).  
One of the key contributions of this paper is that we provide a theory-driven method 
and blueprint to capture polarisation in social media data. Considering potential applications 
of our findings, the current study contributes to understanding how online content about a 
divisive issue (in the context of Australia in this case) brings together members of opposing 
ideological camps who engage in different types of social interactions within their ingroup 
and with the outgroup. Online platforms such as YouTube support intergroup communication 
and provide a platform for potential (cross-group) social learning (Guilbeault, Becker, & 
Centola, 2018), so they can be seen as valuable opportunities for social scientists to study 
such communication in vivo.  
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